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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this paper is to compare the role of human capital accumulation measured 
by number of years of schooling with the relative contribution of institutional capacity to 
prosperity. We employ several concepts of institutional quality prevalent in the literature. 
We discover that developing human capital is as important as superior institutional 
functioning for economic wellbeing. Indeed, the accumulation of human capital stocks via 
increased education might lead to improved institutional functioning, and the utilisation of 
policies like trade liberalisation.  
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1 Introduction 
 
In poor low-income nations economic growth constitutes the principal avenue for 
poverty reduction. Redistribution, even when feasible, can never be enough on its own 
to substantially reduce poverty. Thus, there is a close link between growth and 
poverty reduction. Growth, however, may result not just from policies that foster it 
such as trade policy reforms, but because certain nations have superior institutions 
within which the same policy framework is determined and executed. This also raises 
the issue of reverse causality. Higher incomes that are the result of growth in the 
context of well-functioning institutions, in turn also produce superior institutions that 
are a function of increased per-capita income. By institutions we imply factors that 
result in good governance: political stability, voice and accountability, the rule of law, 
the regulatory framework, bureaucratic quality and the control of corruption (see 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobaton, 2002 for example). There is little controversy 
over the important role played by both human capital and institutional quality in 
fostering growth. Economic development is, however, a complex phenomenon which 
encompasses a multitude of social, economic, political and scientific phenomenon. 
Accounting for all of these factors in order to explain growth is a difficult task. The 
purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the contribution of human capital 
changes upon prosperity via its impact on per-capita income level differences across 
nations. Our paper contributes to the debate over the relative role of institutions versus 
human capital in determining relative levels of prosperity across countries. In this 
connection, some authors such as Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi (2004, henceforth 
Rodrik et. al) claim that institutions dominate all other factors in determining income 
differences across countries; our analysis based on an extension of their very own 
framework is somewhat sceptical of this assertion. Following Glaeser et. al, (2004 a 
and b) we try to examine the role of human capital accumulation in this process, 
finding some support for their view that human capital can be just as important as 
institutional quality in determining relative prosperity, and may even lead to improved 
institutional functioning.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 contains a review of the 
literature covering the debate regarding the key determinants of growth. Sections 3 
(data and methodology) and 4 (regression analysis) contain our contribution to the 
debate. Finally, section 5 concludes with some policy implications. 
 
 
2 Key Determinants of Economic Development: Trade Policy/Openness, 
Institutions and Human Capital 
 
Where do the fundamental and deep determinants of growth lie? Apart from the effort 
required in savings or capital accumulation, do the fundamental determinants of 
growth lie in policies such as trade policy or human capital accumulation or is growth 
fostered by good institutions? In an influential paper, Sachs and Warner (1995) argued 
that countries that were more open (based upon a number of openness indicators) 
grew faster than countries that were not open, hence creating pre-conditions for 
poverty reduction. A country was classified as not open based upon violation of any 
of the indicators. Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), however, have convincingly argued 
that the Sachs and Warner (1995) study suffered from sample selection bias and that 
some openness indicators could be highly correlated with other indicators of good 
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governance or institutional quality. As an example of the first problem, countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa failed to be counted as open as most of them had state monopolies 
controlling the export trade. This is not true because “open” economies as defined by 
Sachs and Warner (1995) such as Indonesia also had state monopolies in petroleum 
for example. Secondly, another indicator of the lack of openness, a black market 
premium on the exchange rate could be highly related to institutional quality 
(corruption, regulatory capacity). Most damaging of the Rodriguez and Rodrik 
critique of Sachs and Warner’s assertion that openness promotes growth lies in the 
fact that an Africa dummy variable capturing the special effect of Africa on cross-
national growth could be substituted for the two crucial openness indicators that 
contributed significantly to growth. 
  
Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) went on to review some of the key cross-national 
empirical literature on the relationship between trade policy and economic growth and 
conclude that there is little evidence that open trade policies, in the sense of lower 
tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, are significantly associated with economic 
growth. The theory on this relationship, in the case of a small economy that takes 
world prices of tradable goods as given, would predict that: (1) in static models with 
no market imperfections and other pre-existing distortions, the effect of a trade 
restriction is to reduce the level of real GDP at world prices. In the presence of market 
failures such as externalities, trade restrictions may increase real GDP (although they 
are hardly ever the first-best means of doing so); (2) in standard models with 
exogenous technological change and diminishing returns to reproducible factors of 
production, a trade restriction has no effect on the long-run (steady-state). 
 
Dollar and Kraay (2002) have evaluated the role of institutions and international trade 
in economic development. They provide evidence that countries with better 
institutions and nations that trade more grow faster. However, they have concluded 
that it is trade which matters more in this nexus as a short term pro-growth strategy, 
institutions featuring more prominently in the long-run. But this conclusion is rejected 
by Rodrik et al (2004), who find that the quality of institutions ‘trumps every thing 
else’. They conclude that when institutions are controlled for, the measures of 
integration have at best insignificant effects on the level of per-capita income.  
 
However, not all institutions matter equally. Democracy may not always contribute to 
growth, as has been the case in rapidly growing nations such as China and Singapore, 
see Barro (1996).  There is also the issue of human capital and its place in fostering 
growth, and even aiding the formation of superior institutions. Glaeser et al (2004a) 
bring forth an important missing link to the debate by suggesting that human capital is 
more important for growth than are institutions. In fact, they go a step further by 
suggesting that human capital actually contributes to institutional improvement. Their 
paper presents the view point that the growth potential of developing countries 
depends more on the leadership qualities (good or bad dictatorships) rather than 
institutional quality. 
 
On the importance of human capital vis-à-vis growth, Schiff (1999), after reviewing 
recent empirical studies on the subject concludes that poor countries can only grow 
faster than rich countries if their initial stock of human capital exceeds the average 
level among other poor nations. For example, when East Asian and South Asian 
economies are compared, differences in human capital and differences in the 
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convergence level seem to move together. For instance, East Asian Developing 
countries witnessed unprecedented increases in GNP per capita over the last three 
decades; 10 times for Malaysia, 65 times for Republic of Korea and 13 times for 
Thailand. During the same period, Asian least developed countries (Bhutan, 
Cambodia and Lao People’s Democratic Republic) and South Asian developing 
countries (Bangladesh, India and Pakistan) saw only a meagre increase in average 
income of between 2  and a little over 5 times.  
 
It is intriguing to note that in 1960s when most of these countries were at similar 
stages of economic development, East Asian developing countries were far ahead of 
both Asian least developed countries and South Asian developing countries in human 
capital. In fact, the total literacy rates for East Asian developing countries in the 1960s 
were as high as 71 percent for the Republic of Korea, 68 percent for Thailand and 
even Malaysia had a rate of over 50 percent. On the other hand, in case of all Asian 
least developed countries and South Asian developing countries, the total literacy 
rates were as low as only 9 percent for Nepal and 15 percent for Pakistan, with 
Cambodia having 38 percent literacy.  
 
After three decades, while Asian least developed countries and South Asian 
developing countries have some what augmented their human capital stocks, the total 
literacy rates are still far below 50 percent in the cases of Bangladesh, Nepal and 
Pakistan. During the same period, however, East Asian developing countries have 
more or less achieved the formidable task of educating most of their people. As a 
result, in the late 1990s, the total literacy rate of the Republic of Korea had reached 98 
percent, and Malaysia managed to achieve a rate of about 90 percent. In short, 
economic progress in East Asia during the 1980s may have occurred because of their 
well developed human capital endowment which gathered  momentum in the 1960s or 
earlier.  
 
Figure 1 (appendix 1) elaborates how the inter-relationship between growth, 
institutions, human capital and trade works. Any analysis, which attempts to capture 
the effects of institutions and openness on prosperity, is fraught with the problems of 
endogeneity and reverse causation. For example richer and more developed countries 
have better institutions and they are more liberalised with regard to trade than more 
underdeveloped nations. So a pertinent question can be raised as to whether affluent 
countries are rich because they are more open and have better institutions or does this 
relationship work in reverse? There is also a debate as to whether better institutions 
encourage trade, or if it is openness and liberalisation that cause institutional 
improvement. There is some evidence to suggest that both possibilities exist (see for 
example: Anderson and Mercuiller, 1999; and Wei, 2000). “The extent to which an 
economy is integrated with the rest of the world and the quality of its institutions are 
both endogenous, shaped potentially not just by each other but also by income levels.  
Problems of endogeneity and reverse causality plague any empirical researcher trying 
to make sense of relationship among these causal factors (Rodrik et al, 2004:2).” 
Similarly human capital is also endogenous as it affects institutions as well as 
openness. Countries with higher levels of human capital are also the ones which have 
better institutions. Lipset (1960) suggests that high levels of human capital resulting 
from education leads to more benign politics, less violence and more political 
stability. Similarly, nations that grow faster have more resources at their disposal to 
improve human capital levels. Generally rich countries have a much higher level of 
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human development than less developed countries. Furthermore, if more open 
economies are the countries that are more affluent, then not only growth but openness 
too may be the product of human capital formation.  
 
 
3 Data and Methodology  
 
In the light of the above debate our model includes many of the core determinants of 
growth, namely international economic integration (including measures of openness 
and trade policy), measures of institutional quality, physical and human capital.  In 
fact, our dependent variable is not growth per se, but the log of income per-capita, as 
in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al (2004).  Differences in per-capita 
income across countries are, of course, often a result of differential growth rates in the 
past. Here we follow the practice in Easterly and Levine (2003) and Rodrik et al 
(2004) where the relative contribution of policies and institutions in explaining per-
capita income differentials is tested. Our sample includes both rich OECD countries 
and developing countries.  As regards “policy”, we examine the effect of both 
openness, as in Rodrik et al (2004), as well as trade policy variables. Openness 
indicators are an outcome variable, pointing to the extent to which a country trades as 
a proportion of national income. Trade policy indicators are, however, a more direct 
measure of the policy stance, and this was not examined in Rodrik et al. (2004). We 
deem these policy variables to be of greater significance in a test of the relative 
efficacy of policy vis-à-vis institutions.   
 
 
 
The final equation to be estimated takes the following form:  
 
iiiiii PKHKTPNy εηγχβα +++++=log ………………. (1) 
 
The variable iy is income per capita in country i, iN , iTP , iHK , and iPK are 
respectively measures for institutions, integration, human capital and physical capital 
and iε  is the random error term. Human Capital is represented by average schooling 
years. We will employ several concepts of institutional quality, trade policy and 
openness variables following various definitions prevalent in the literature. For 
example, we take into account the six different classifications of institutions identified 
by Kaufman et al (2002), namely rule of law (Rl), political stability (Ps), regulatory 
quality (Rq), government effectiveness (Ge), voice and accountability (Va) and 
control of corruption (Ctc).1 Rodrik et al (2004) only consider the rule of law. On the 
international economic integration front, we have carefully chosen three specific 
measures of openness. The ratio of nominal imports plus exports to GDP (lcopen) is 
the conventional openness indicator (see Frankel and Romer, 1999; Alcala and 
Ciccone, 2002; Rose, 2002; Dollar and Kraay, 2002; Rodrik et al, 2004). There are 
indicators of trade restrictiveness acting as measures of trade policy (Edwards, 1998; 
Greenaway et al, 2001, Rose 2002). Import tariffs as percentage of imports (Tariffs), 
and trade taxes as a ratio of overall trade (Txtrg) can be considered as good proxies 
for trade restrictiveness and have also been employed in our study.  
                                                 
1 The value of these variables range from -2.5 (worst) to 2.5 (best) for every country in the sample. 
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As indicated earlier, there are potential endogeneity problems between per-capita 
income and institutions, per-capita income and human capital, as well as between 
openness (or the trade policy stance) and income per-capita. One way of cleansing our 
empirical analysis from endogeneity in explanatory variables and the reverse causality 
between dependent and independent variables is to adopt Instrumental Variable (IV) 
techniques in the context of two stage least squares regression analysis (2SLS).  As a 
first step to run IV regressions we have to find appropriate instruments for  our 3 
openness/ trade policy variables and 6 institutional concepts. The first stage 
estimation includes instruments for the two explanatory variables with potential 
endogeneity problems. The regression estimate in the next stage utilises the predicted 
variables of these variables for institutions and trade policy/openness in a standard 
per-capita income or growth regression as in (1).  
 
The literature clearly establishes that predicted trade shares following Frankel and 
Romer (FR) (1999) from a gravity equation is the most appropriate instrument for 
openness/trade policy. On the other hand, the most compelling institutional instrument 
is the measure of settler mortality suggested by Acemolgu, Johnson and Robinson 
(2001). But the data is only available for 64 countries. Though Rodrik et al (2004) 
have extended it to 80 countries; it still covers a relatively low number when 
compared to another widely used institutional instrument namely ‘fractions of the 
population speaking English (Engfrac) and Western European languages as the first 
language (Eurfrac)’ which covers as many as 140 countries. Thus following Dollar 
and Kraay (2002) and Hall and Jones (1999), we use this instrument for our 
institutional proxies. We have employed total public spending on education (as a 
percentage of GDP) and primary public-teacher ratio as two instruments for human 
capital, which is proxied by average years of schooling at age 25. The former 
instrument captures the quality of education and the later instrument captures the 
quantity of education. As in Rodrik et al (2004), we employ ‘distance from the 
equator’ as a fifth instrument (proxy for geography). This is a purely exogenous 
concept. 
 
Our IV regression model has three equations, where in the first stage we generate 
predicted values of institutions, openness/ trade policy and human capital respectively 
by regressing them on a set of instruments.  
 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGN εθρϖτνφλ +++++++= 1111111 ………..(2) 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGTP εθρϖτνφλ +++++++= 2222222 ……..(3) 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGHK εθρϖτνφλ +++++++= 3333333 ……..(4) 
 
 
where iENG  and iEUR are our instruments for institutions referring to fractions of 
population speaking English and European languages respectively. iFR is instrument 
for trade policy. TlEX is total public spending on education as a percentage of GDP 
and PTR is primary public-teacher ratio and both are instruments for human capital. 
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iGEO  is proxy for geography showing distance from the equator. At the second stage 
the predicted values of respective institutional and openness variables are employed in 
the per-capita income equation (1) along with concepts of human capital and physical 
capital.  
 
4.       Regression Results 
 
It would be interesting to know what information our first stage results give us 
regarding the quality of instruments. Table 1 (Appendix 1) suggests that for nearly all 
specifications of openness and institutional quality, the respective instruments carry 
the right signs. In some cases when the instruments carry the wrong signs, they are 
also insignificant. The (FR) instrument is statistically significant for all openness 
variables and 2 out of 6 trade policy variables. Though (FR) is not significant for most 
trade policy variables, there is a strong one to one correlation between trade policy 
and (FR) instrument because the former variable always enters the trade policy 
equation with a right sign.  Similarly ENG and EUR come out as sound instruments 
for institutions as they have generally been significant and always with a right sign. 
Similarly TLEX and PTR establish themselves as good instruments for human capital.  
However, note that for trade taxes (Txtrg) the signs for public spending on education 
(TLEX) are positive and they are highly significant. This suggests that in an effort to 
integrate more with the world economy, if governments decrease their trade 
restrictiveness, their development expenditure would bear the brunt of cuts and they 
may be compromising their goals in the education sector by investing less on 
education.    
 
 
Moving on to the second stage regression analysis (table 2), we employ three 
estimation specifications for our right-hand side variables (see appendix 2 for data 
definitions and details). In specification 1 we combine openness or trade policy 
indicators with institutions as well as human and physical capital; specification 2 
contains openness or trade policy indicators along with institutions and human capital 
but not physical capital; and specification 3 is the Rodrik et al. model with trade 
policy openness indicators juxtaposed against institutions only. We argue that 
specification 1 is a richer model, as it contains roles for human and physical capital in 
explaining per-capita income differences across nations.     
 
Only for specification 3 which corresponds to the specification followed by Rodrik et 
al (2004), the results turn out to be similar to their study. Institutions clearly trump 
openness and trade policy as they have been highly significant in most cases. In 
contrast to institutional proxies, openness variables generally remained insignificant, 
and if significant have mostly entered equation 1 with a wrong sign. Trade policy 
variables also remained insignificant under specification 3 with the exception of trade 
taxes which are significant in some cases.  
 
However, for specifications 1 and 2, where human capital enters equation 1, the 
results present a different picture and challenge the position taken up by Rodrik et al 
(2004) apropos the superiority of institutions. For specification 1 and 2 institutions are 
overwhelmingly insignificant. Compared to specification 3, the frequency of 
insignificance for openness reaches nearly 100 percent in specifications 1 and 2 when 
human capital is considered. Openness proxies are insignificant, as well as having the 
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wrong signs in most cases. The insignificance of openness proxies capturing the level 
of trade or movements in terms of trade is not surprising. These results are in 
accordance with the findings of Dollar and Kraay (2002) and Rodrik (1998), who 
suggest that the correlation of trade levels and growth performance is at best weak in 
the long run. Our results reinforce this fact in a more comprehensive manner, as we 
have provided additional specifications to the per-capita income equation by including 
human capital and physical capital. Especially, the inclusion of human capital has 
improved the explanatory power of our model. 
 
One reason for getting insignificant values for institutions in specification 1 and 2 
could be because human capital influences economic development by improving the 
working of institutions, as suggested by Lipset (1960) and recently re-emphasised in 
Glaeser et al (2004a and 2004b). Our results support this, as we find that human 
capital is mostly significant when it enters in equation 1 under specifications 1 and 2, 
taking over from institutions in explaining differences in per capita income. 
 
To investigate possible complementarities between institutions and human capital we 
would like to further investigate the inter-relationship between human capital 
formation and institutional quality.  To this effect we modify our explanatory equation 
for per-capita income determination in equation (1), by including an interaction term, 
where we interact human capital with six available concepts of institutional quality. 
The object is to determine the impact of human capital on institutional development, 
while at the same time accounting for and solving the endogeneity problems in 
institutions and human capital.  
 
 
iiiiii PKNHKTPNy 2).(log ετζ +++++= Dhl …………………(5) 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGN ∈+∂++++++= 1111111 lh ϕκδψ ……….. (6) 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGTP ∈+∂++++++= 2222222 lh ϕκδψ ………(7) 
 
Niiiiiii GEOPTRTLEXFREURENGNHK ∈+∂++++++= 2222222).( lh ϕκδψ ..(8) 
 
 
Here iN  and iTP  are respectively the predicted values for institutions and integration, 
and ).( it NHK is the interaction term where we treat each institutional variable as a 
dummy by assigning a score of 0 for the values which are negative, and 1 for the 
values which are positive. The only difference between model 1 and model 4 is that in 
the later case human capital enters the per capita difference equation as part of the 
interaction term. Since institutions enter the interaction term in dummy variable form, 
).( it NHK  can be instrumented by TLEX and PTR as can be seen from equation 8. 
Table 3 shows the results for equation (5). The results confirm that institutions and 
human capital are significantly related to each other especially for voice and 
accountability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control for 
corruption. 
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An important observation from table 3 is that interaction terms overwhelmingly carry 
positive signs. This means that institutions and human capital are complements and 
any improvement in levels of education will promote institutional quality of the 
country and vice versa. Here, we can say that human capital is as important in 
explaining per-capita and growth differentials as institutions. This is in line with the 
findings of Glaeser et al (2004a) who concluded their study with following remarks: 
“the existing research cannot convincingly show that institutions rather than human 
capital have a causal effect on economic growth (p.41)”.  
 
 
In that respect we have somewhat addressed the ‘institutional dilemma’2 mentioned in 
Rodrik et al (2004) as we find that human capital and institutions are complements. 
Thus, if institutional improvement is at the fore of the policy makers’ priority list, 
investment in education is a pre-requisite for meeting goals on institutional front. 
 
5       Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
Clearly, the importance of institutions in determining the economic development of a 
country cannot be overemphasised. Institutions, whether the rule of law, voice and 
accountability, political stability, regulatory quality, control of corruption or 
government effectiveness, are all pre-requisites for development and are the catalyst 
for the success of any development strategy. But the fact remains that institutions or 
institutional development is a long term phenomenon, and is not an objective policy 
concept for short term economic strategies to achieve higher economic growth. That is 
why even after finding institutions rule over integration, Rodrik et al (2004) conclude 
their paper with following lines: “How much guidance do our results provide to policy 
makers who want to improve the performance of their economies? Not much at all. 
Sure, it is helpful to know that geography is not destiny, or that focusing on increasing 
the economy’s links with world markets is unlikely to yield convergence. But the 
operational guidance that our central result on the primacy of institutional quality 
yields is extremely meagre.” 
 
Mere institutional superiority has no practical application for policy makers in the 
short run.  Since institutions cannot be modified in a short span of time, they may be 
beyond the scope of a lot of policy making. So where do we stand? How can we make 
the importance of institutions more relevant for policy makers by unlocking this 
‘institutional dilemma’? To this effect we have tried to find a close substitute for 
institutions which would also responds to the short term policy time framework. 
According to Glaeser et al (2004a) the existing research cannot convincingly show 
that institutions rather than human capital have a causal effect on economic growth. 
They provide evidence to suggest that it is human capital which also contributes to 
institutional development and not the other way around. “Ëducation is needed for 
courts to operate and to empower citizens to engage with government institutions. 
Literacy encourages the spread of knowledge about government malfeasance.  Social 
connections make it possible to form private groups, which then take on the task of 
challenging the state. According to this view, countries differ ultimately in their 
stocks of human and social capital, and the institutional outcomes depend on this 
endowment (Ibid, 2004:19).”  An important message one can extract from their paper 
is that human capital can be a close substitute for institutions, as human capital and 
                                                 
2 Institutional superiority fails to have any operational value for policy makers. 
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institutions tend to move together: “All or nearly all high human capital countries are 
stable democracies. All or nearly all low human capital countries are dictatorships, 
with virtually no checks and balances (ibid, 2004a: 41).” 
 
To summarise, we find that developing human capital is as important as superior 
institutional functioning for economic wellbeing. Indeed, the accumulation of human 
capital stocks via increased education might lead to improved institutional 
functioning, and the utilisation of policies like trade liberalisation. The evidence 
regarding the importance of human capital is clear cut in the growth literature. Indeed 
any country which is currently developed, or any country on the verge of 
development, has first seen significant improvements in human capital. Policies aimed 
at educational improvement yield a double dividend: they improve institutions in the 
longer-run and in the shorter-run they will allow for greater gains to the economy 
from trade liberalisation. Eventually, superior institutional functioning will lead to 
greater home-grown (endogenous) democracy and make absolute poverty 
unacceptable.  
 
 
Finally, a cautionary note on the institutional data (Kaufmann et al, 2002) is in order. 
Much of this data, as Glaeser et al. (2002a and 2002b) argue, are outcome variables, 
except perhaps for the rule of law. In future studies we need to employ better 
indicators of institutional policies.       
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Appendix 1:  
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Table 1: First Stage Regression Results for Instrumental variables: 
First Stage Results 
  
Hk 
 
lcopen 
 
Tariff 
 
Txtrg 
 
Va 
 
Ps 
 
Ge 
 
Rq 
 
Rl 
 
Ctc 
           
Lfrkrom -0.25 0.524 -0.86 0.008 0.067 0.052 0.102 0.013 0.08 0.134 
 (-0.81) (9.32)* (-0.53) (1.52) (0.62) (0.46) (1.07) (0.14) (0.85) (1.32) 
Engfrac 1.28 0.421 -3.73 0.017 0.75 0.252 0.469 0.175 0.42 0.569 
 (1.43) (2.31)** (-0.72) (1.33) (2.04)** (0.68) (1.49) (0.56) (1.29) (1.69)*** 
Eurfrac 0.728 -0.115 -2.40 -0.006 0.495 0.296 0.47 0.54 0.247 0.353 
 (1.10) (-0.91) (-0.67) (-0.59) (2.03)** (1.21) (2.26)** (2.67)** (1.15) (1.59) 
Tlex 0.182 0.08 0.201 0.012 0.0048 0.037 0.029 0.03 0.079 0.092 
 (1.26) (3.35)* (0.24) (5.10)* (0.10) (0.78) (0.71) (0.97) (1.92)** (2.15)** 
Ptr -0.097 0.001 0.083 0.001 -0.0063 -0.013 -0.006 -0.005 -0.012 -0.005 
 (-
4.58)* 
(0.43) (0.72) (3.94)* (-0.84) (-
1.7)*** 
(-1.03) (-0.92) (-
1.8)*** 
(-0.85) 
Disteq 0.049 -0.004 -0.216 -
0.0008 
0.026 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.025 0.0281 
 (2.95)* (-0.30) (-
2.40)** 
(-
3.05)* 
(4.43)* (3.68)* (4.79)* (1.96)** (4.70)* (5.03)* 
           
N 58 81 60 34 79 73 73 78 78 75 
F 20.63* 23.1* 3.28* 12.5* 13.1 10.76* 15.6* 6.95* 18.5* 18.23* 
R2 0.70 0.65 0.27 0.73 0.52 0.49 0.57 0.37 0.61 0.61 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. 
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Table 2.  Second Stage Regression Results for Institutions and Hk under Multiple Specifications 
Independent 
Variables 
Specification Significant  Right Sign Significant and  Right Sign 
 
Institutions 
Va 1 1 out of 3 2 out of 3 1 out of 1 
 2 1 out of 3 2 out of 3 1 out of 1 
 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Ps 1 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 2 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Ge 1 0 out of 3 3 out of 3 None 
 2 0 out of 3 3 out of 3 None 
 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Rq 1 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 2 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Rl 1 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 2 0 out of 3 2 out of 3 None 
 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Ctc 1 0 out of 3 0 out of 3 None 
 2 0 out of 3 0 out of 3 None 
 3 0 out of 3 3 out of 3 3 out of 3 
Human Capital 
 
Hk 
 
1 
 
18 out of 18 
 
18 out of 18 
 
18 out of 18 
 2 18 out of 18 18 out of 18 18 out of 18 
 
Pk 
 
1 
 
0 out of 18 
 
15 out of 18 
 
None 
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for 
endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993). 
- The table illustrates the results for equation 1 under various general specifications. i.e., specification 1: 
openness or trade policy + Institutions + Hk +Pk,  Specification 2: openness or trade policy + Institutions + Hk,                               
Specification 3: openness or trade policy + Institutions. 
- Note that specification 3 corresponds to the one adopted by Rodrik et al (2004) for their growth equation. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Interaction between Human Capital and Institutions 
 
Dependent Variable: Log of Per Capita Income 
 
Independent 
Variables  
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
8 
 
9 
 
10 
 
11 
 
12 
 
13 
 
14 
 
15 
 
16 
 
17 
 
18 
 
Lcopen 
 
0.092 
 
-0.142 
 
-0.161 
 
-0.062 
 
-0.247 
 
-0.287 
            
 (0.34) (-0.59) (-0.83) (-0.34) (-1.10) (-1.59)             
Tariffs       0.0006 -0.105 -0.055 0.079 -0.091 -0.122       
       (0.01) (-0.83) (-1.07) (0.77) (-2.2)** (-2.1)**       
Txtrdg             -17.89 -17.21 -7.29 -17.19 -13.42 -20.13 
             (-1.8)*** (-2.2)** (-0.98) (-1.7)*** (-2.0)** (-2.8)* 
Va -0.844      -9.86      1.85      
 (-0.85)      (-0.87)      (1.11)      
Ps  1.518      -4.01      0.666     
  (0.64)      (-0.58)      (0.70)     
Ge   -0.062      -0.721      0.837    
   (-0.09)      (-0.63)      (1.47)    
Rq    0.257      0.725      -0.79   
    (0.37)      (0.54)      (-0.62)   
Rl     1.492      -0.093      1.14  
     (1.9)***      (-0.10)      (2.2)**  
Ctc      0.347      -0.759      0.144 
      (0.72)      (-0.80)      (0.19) 
Interaction(hk.va) 0.501      0.516      -0.210      
 (2.52)*      (2.06)**      (-0.55)      
Interaction(hk.Ps)  0.004      0.951      0.046     
  (0.01)      (0.73)      (0.23)     
Interaction(hk.Ge)   0.323      0.367      0.062    
   (2.32)*      (1.7)***      (0.51)    
Interaction(hk.Rq)    0.328      0.384      0.34   
    (3.56)*      (2.67)*      (1.98)***   
Interaction(hk.Rl)     -0.007      0.201      -0.065  
     (-0.04)      (1.14)      (-0.52)  
Interaction(hk.Ctc)      0.002      0.305      0.157 
      (0.15)      (1.7)***      (0.82) 
Pk 0.012 -0.013 0.005 0.023 -0.003 0.002 0.004 -0.001 -0.012 0.032 -0.007 -0.025 0.033 0.035 0.008 0.079 0.013 0.045 
 (0.50) (-0.42) (0.34) (1.42) (-0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (-0.03) (-0.48) (1.12) (-0.34) (-0.75) (0.81) (1.10) (0.32) (1.81)*** (0.15) (1.45) 
 
N 
 
60 
 
59 
 
59 
 
60 
 
60 
 
59 
 
53 
 
52 
 
52 
 
53 
 
53 
 
52 
 
31 
 
31 
 
31 
 
31 
 
31 
 
31 
F 19.1* 21.08 33.6* 38.5* 32.7* 37.6* 15.23* 2.75* 19.03* 16.99* 21.4* 18.8* 16.9* 25.1* 39.6* 22.7* 36.4* 29.5* 
R2 0.40 0.48 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.72 0.35 - 048 0.40 0.54 0.10 0.68 0.78 0.85 0.75 0.84 0.81 
 
- t- Values in the parenthesis. *, **, *** denotes significance at 1%, 5 % and 10% levels respectively. 
- Standard errors are corrected for as we run Durbin–Wu–Hausman test (augmented regression test) for endogeneity (see Davidson and MacKinnon. 1993). 
Appendix 2:  
 
Variables, Definition, Year, Source and Expected Impact 
 
Variables 
 
Definition, Year and Source Expected 
Impact on 
Per capita 
Income 
 
Dependent Variable 
 
LnY 
 
Natural logarithm of Per Capita Income at purchasing Power Prices (PPP), Year: 
2000. Source: World Development Indicators (WDI), 2002. 
 
 
- 
 
Independent 
Variables 
  
 
 
Institutional Proxies: 
 
 
(They comprise of aggregate governance indicators for six dimensions of 
governance covering 175 countries.  Kaufman et al (2002) relied on 194 
different measures of governance drawn from 17 different sources of 
subjective governance data constructed by  15 different sources including 
international organizations, political and business risk rating agencies, 
think tanks and non governmental organizations. The governance 
indicators have been oriented so that higher values correspond to better 
outcomes on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5. ) 
 
 
 
Va 
 
 
Voice and Accountability: (i) Does State legitimately represent its citizens. (ii) Legal 
system/ transparency and fairness (iii) Political rights (iv) Freedom of speech (v) 
Business have voice to express and they are informed, Year: 1997/98. Source: 
Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
positive      if 
>0 
negative if<0 
 
Ps 
 
Political Stability: (i) Military coup risk (ii) Major insurgency Rebellion (iii) 
Political terrorism (iv) Political Assassination (v) Civil War (vi) Major Urban Riot 
(vii) New government honors commitments of previous government Year: 1997/98. 
Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
positive      if 
>0 
negative if<0 
 
Ge 
 
Government Effectiveness : (i) Operation Risk Index : Bureaucratic delays (ii) 
State’s ability to formulate and implement national policy initiatives (iii) 
Effectiveness at collecting taxes or other forms of government revenue (iv) State’s 
ability to create, deliver and maintain vital national infrastructure (v) State’s ability 
to respond effectively to domestic economic problems (vi) Institutional failure: A 
deterioration of government capacity to cope with national problems as a result of 
institutional rigidity or gridlock (vii) Government policy/ Pro business orientation 
(viii) Government decetralisation, independent and responsibilities or local and 
regional governments, and legislative and executive transparency (ix) Wasteful 
government expenditutre (x) Public service vulnerability to political pressure (xi) 
Government economic policies are independent of pressure from special interest 
groups (xii) Quality of public health (xiii) quality of public education (xiv) quality of 
central bank,  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
positive       if 
>0 
negative if<0 
 
Rq 
 
Regulatory Quality :  (i) Restrictions on ownership of Business by non-residents (ii) 
Restriction on ownership of equities (iii) Price liberalisation (iv) Trade & Foreign 
exchange system (v) Competition Policy (vi) Commercial law effectiveness (vii) 
Commercial law extensiveness (viii) Financial regulations: extensiveness (ix) 
Financial Regulations: effectiveness (x) Large scale privatisation (xi) small scale 
Privatisation (xii) Governance and enterprise restructuring (xiii) Banking reform and 
interest rate liberalisation (xiv) Securities market and non bank financial institutions 
(xv) Bankruptcy law (xvi) Minimal administrative regulations that constrain 
businesses (xvii) Wage/ Price Controls, Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al 
(2002) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
positive        
if >0 
negative if<0 
   
 ii 
   
Variables 
 
Definition, Year and Source Expected 
Impact on 
Per capita 
Income 
 
Rl 
 
Rule of Law : (i) Enforceability of contracts (ii) Losses and costs of crime (iii) 
Kidnapping of foreigners (iv) crime (v) Corruption of bank officials (vi) Extent of 
tax evasion (vii) Costs of organised crime for business (viii) Police effectiveness in 
safeguarding personal scurity (ix) independence of the juidiciary from interference 
by the government and/or parties to the dispute (x) Private business has recourse to 
independent and impartial courts for challenging the legality of government (xi) 
Financial assets and wealth are well protected (xii) Private business are more likely 
to settle disputes outside court (xiii) Concern with level of crome (xiv) Black market 
(xv) Property rights (xvi) Feeling of personal safety (xvii) Equal opportunities to 
access justice (xviii)Equality before the law (xix) Courts – fair and impartial (xx) 
courts- affordable (xxi) Courts- consistent (xxii) Court’s enforceability (xxiii) 
Confidence in judicial system today in insuring property rights (xxiv) General 
constraint- functioning of judiciary (xxv) Obstacles to competition-violation of 
patents (xxvi) quality of courts (xxvii) Parallel economy as obstacle to business 
development  Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
 
 
 
positive       if 
>0 
negative if<0 
 
Ctc 
 
Control for Corruption: Improper practices in the public sphere (ii) Frequency of 
additional payments (iii) Dishonest courts (iv) Corruption as obstacle to business (v) 
Bribery (% of Gross Revenues) (vi) State Capture (BPS) (vii) Percent of public 
officials viewed to be corrupt (viii) Percent who believe the government is corrupt 
(ix) Additional Payments: bureaucracy (x) Additional payments: judiciary (xi) 
Severity of corruption within the state (xii) Political risk index: Internal causes of 
political risk: Mentality, including xenophobia, nationalism, corruption, nepotism, 
willingness to compromise, etc Year: 1997/98. Source: Kaufman et al (2002) 
 
positive       if 
>0 
negative if<0 
  
 
Openness :  
 
 
 
(They are general openness indicators which are the outcome based measures of the 
extent a country is open to international trade and captures the level of trade with 
other countries). 
 
 
 
Lcopen:  
 
 
 
Natural logarithm of openness. Openness is given by the ratio of (nominal) imports 
plus exports to GDP (in nominal US dollars), Year: 1985. Source: Penn World 
Tables, Mark 6. 
 
 
 positive 
 
 
Trade Policy:  
 
 
(Trade policy comprises of various forms of tariffs and non tariff barriers to control 
the level of trade with other countries and direct measures of trade policy.) 
 
 
 
tariffs 
 
 
Import duties as a percentage of imports, Year: 1985, Source World Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
 
 
negative 
 
Txtrdg 
 
 
Total revenue from taxes on international trade as a proportion of total trade, Year: 
1982, Source: Rose(2002)  
 
 
 
negative 
 
Human Capital 
 
Average Level of Education in a country 
 
 
 
Hk 
 
 
Average Schooling Years in the total Population at 25, Year: 1999,  Source: Barro 
and Lee data set http://post.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/barro/data.html 
 
 
positive 
Other Exogenous  
Variables: 
 
  
 
Pk 
 
Gross capital formation as a Percentage of GDP, Year: 2000, Source: World 
Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
positive 
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Variables 
 
Definition, Year and Source Expected 
Impact  
 
Instrumental 
Variables 
 Expected 
impact on 
variables 
they are 
instrumented 
for 
 
Lfrkrom 
 
Natural logarithm of predicted trade shares computed following Frankel and Romer 
(1999) from a bilateral trade equation with ‘pure geography’ variables. Source: 
Frankel and Romer (1999). 
 
 
positive 
Engfrac Fraction of te population speaking English. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi 
(2002) 
 
 
 positive 
Eurfrac Fraction of the population speaking one of the major languages of Western Europe: 
English, French, German, Portuguese, or Spanish. Source: Rodrik, Subramanian & 
Trebbi (2002) 
 
positive 
Tlex Public spending on education, total (as a percentage of GDP), Year: 1999, 
Source WDI( 2002) 
 
positive 
Ptr Pupil-teacher ratio, primary Year: 1999, Source WDI( 2002) 
 
 
negative 
Disteq Distance from Equator of capital city measured as abs (Latitude)/90.  Source: 
Rodrik, Subramanian & Trebbi (2002) 
 
Depends as it 
is a common 
instrument 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
